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The long-term fiscal outlook of most high-income coun-
tries is grim. Should independent central bankers be afraid
of an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, i.e., fiscal imbalances
spilling over to monetary policy and jeopardizing price stabil-
ity? To provide some insights, this paper tracks the interac-
tions between fiscal and monetary policies in the data since
1980 for Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. In doing so it uses a com-
bination of time-varying parameter vector autoregression with
sign, magnitude, and contemporaneous restrictions identifica-
tion. Unlike conventional approaches, this can capture changes
in monetary and fiscal behavior that are gradual and differ
across the two policies. Our results show that in the United
States the degree of monetary policy accommodation of fiscal
shocks (debt-financed government spending) increased gradu-
ally between the late 1980s and the 2008 crisis, i.e., over the
whole tenure of Chairman Greenspan. In contrast, it seems
to have decreased over this period in the United Kingdom,
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Australia, Switzerland, and Canada. Our benchmark analysis
and several robustness checks show that legislating numerical
inflation targets may account for some of the country differ-
ences, presumably because they may shift the strategic power
from fiscal to monetary policy. We conclude by considering the
implications of our results for the long-term likelihood of an
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic in the six countries.
JEL Codes: E61, C10.
1. Introduction
Many countries face substantial fiscal challenges going forward. The
expansionary responses to the 2008 global financial crisis combined
with a large intertemporal gap between government expenditures
and revenues have led to rapidly growing debt-to-GDP ratios, fore-
cast to deteriorate further due to aging populations.1
These cyclical and structural developments have brought a new
wave of discussions on whether fiscal policy may affect the conduct of
monetary policy and, if so, how. Is formal central bank independence
sufficient to shelter monetary policy from long-term fiscal imbal-
ances? Or do these eventually spill over and lead to a suboptimally
high level or variability of inflation, as some observers fear? The
seminal work of Sargent and Wallace (1981) showed that when fiscal
policymakers are unable or unwilling to balance their books, the cen-
tral bank is subject to an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. Under
such fiscal dominance, undesirable departures from price stability
due to forced debt monetization are likely to arise.2
The paper makes two main contributions—one on the macro-
economic policy front and one on the econometric front. Regard-
ing the former, it tracks monetary-fiscal policy interactions over
time in six advanced countries in order to provide some insights
into the long-term danger of an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.
1See, for example, International Monetary Fund (2009), which reports the net
present value of the impact of aging-related spending on fiscal deficits to be in
the order of hundreds of percent of GDP for most high-income countries.
2Leeper’s (1991) fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) provides another
avenue through which excessive fiscal policy may threaten monetary stability.
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Specifically, we estimate how monetary policy responses to debt-
financed government spending shocks have evolved since 1980 (with
a focus on the pre-2008 period) in Australia, Canada, Japan,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Our main finding is that monetary policy in the United
States has become more accommodative of fiscal shocks over
time, well before the 2008 crisis. The gradually growing “mone-
tary accommodation”—reducing interest rates in response to debt-
financed government expenditures—can be observed throughout the
whole tenure of Chairman Alan Greenspan, i.e., starting in the late
1980s. Furthermore, it occurs not only on impact (the period the
shock occurred) but also over longer horizons. This is in contrast
to the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland, where
the opposite trend of less accommodation seems to have occurred.
In fact, in the latter three countries the central banks started “mon-
etary offsetting,” that is, raising interest rates in response to debt-
financed government spending.
Our subsequent analysis provides some (albeit not fully conclu-
sive) evidence that the differences in monetary responses to fis-
cal shocks observed across countries and over time may be partly
due to adoption of numerical inflation targets. It appears that such
explicit monetary commitment may be able to discipline the central
bank—improving monetary outcomes, as well as the government—
improving fiscal outcomes. These effects can best be understood
through a game of chicken, in which both monetary and fiscal policy-
makers prefer the other policy to deal with growing long-term debt
overhang, but both would like to avoid a fiscal crisis that arises
if neither institution does so. In game-theoretic terms, there are
two asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibriums and one in mixed
strategies (representing regime switching). In such a strategic situa-
tion, transparent and accounted-for inflation targets shift the power
away from the fiscal policymaker to the monetary policymaker, mak-
ing the central bank the leader in the game. Because of that, leg-
islated numerical inflation targets may reduce the likelihood of an
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.
Combining all our results suggests that the longer-term dan-
ger of forced debt monetarization of fiscal imbalances is highest in
the United States and Japan, lower in Switzerland and the United
Kingdom, and lower still in Australia and Canada.
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The paper’s methodological contribution, discussed in detail in
the next section, is combining the vector autoregression (VAR) fea-
turing time-varying parameters (TVP) with an identification of fiscal
shocks based on a mix of sign, magnitude, and contemporaneous
restrictions.
The TVP-VAR framework was introduced in Cogley and Sargent
(2005) and Primiceri (2005).3 Its flexibility enables us to examine
medium- to long-term changes in policy behavior over and above
the short-run stabilization issues explored in fixed-parameter VARs.
Given the dire long-term fiscal projections in most high-income coun-
tries, we believe that such extended focus is warranted. In com-
parison with standard approaches featuring structural breaks, the
TVP-VAR framework allows for structural policy changes (i) to be
gradual, and (ii) to differ in their timing across the two policies. For
these reasons, an analysis based on TVP-VARs may be superior to
an analysis based on data subsamples.4 In addition, the employed
framework assumes stochastic volatility, which is an important factor
to estimate the dynamics accurately. It must, however, be acknowl-
edged that the use of TVP-VARs requires a reduced number of
endogenous variables and lags to keep the set of model parameters
manageable.5
Kirchner, Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier (2010) and Pereira and
Lopes (2010) employed the TVP-VAR framework to assess the
effect of fiscal policy shocks. The former paper focuses on the euro
area, using the traditional recursive assumption (e.g., as Fata´s and
3TVP-VARs have been used by many studies primarily to analyze the mon-
etary policy transmission (e.g., Canova, Gambetti, and Pappa 2007; Benati and
Surico 2008). But there have also been applications to fiscal policy (Kirchner,
Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier 2010; Pereira and Lopes 2010), financial issues
(Abbate et al. 2016), exchange rate dynamics (Mumtaz and Sunder-Plassmann
2013), oil price shocks transmission (Baumeister and Peersman 2013), yield-curve
dynamics (Bianchi, Mumtaz, and Surico 2009) and business cycle dynamics in
general (Benati 2008).
4It has been documented that in many advanced countries monetary and fiscal
policy with their policy regimes have changed over time; see, for example, Clarida,
Gal´ı, and Gertler (1998) or Davig and Leeper (2011). Fiscal policy analyses based
on subsamples can be found in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2008), or
Pappa (2010).
5With five endogenous variables and two lags, our analysis already features
over 10,000 parameters to estimate.
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Mihov 2001) to identify government spending shocks. Pereira and
Lopes (2010) examine the United States and identify the tax-net-
of-transfers shock and the spending shock. This is along the lines of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who exploit institutional information
on taxes and transfers to separate automatic movements of fiscal
variables from fiscal policy shocks.
While the identification approach in Kirchner, Cimadomo, and
Hauptmeier (2010) and Pereira and Lopes (2010) based on the
assumption of lagged reactions among endogenous variables is suit-
able in many contexts, it may be too restrictive for monetary-
fiscal interactions. This is because it implies that either the mon-
etary authority does not react contemporaneously to fiscal shocks
or the fiscal authority neglects contemporary movements in mon-
etary policy. In other words, such specification implicitly imposes
unrealistic timing assumptions about the interaction between the
central bank and the government. As the game-theoretic exami-
nation of monetary-fiscal interactions dating back to Sargent and
Wallace (1981) suggests, the exact timing of moves determining pol-
icy leadership is a crucial determinant of the outcomes of both poli-
cies. Similarly, the empirical investigation of Kirsanova and le Roux
(2013) demonstrates that “fiscal policy plays an important role in
identifying the monetary policy regime.”
Our identification strategy based on sign restrictions therefore
has an advantage in that no timing assumptions on the monetary-
fiscal interaction need to be imposed. On the other hand, sign restric-
tions are a weak identification approach, as there are multiple struc-
tural models that correspond to the estimated reduced-form model
and satisfy the signs imposed on the impulse responses (Fry and
Pagan 2011). We mitigate this potential problem by adding a set of
contemporaneous and magnitude restrictions.6
The changing patterns of monetary policy responses to fiscal
shocks detected in the data made us explore whether a specific insti-
tutional reform, namely adoption of legislated inflation targets, may
explain some of the differences observed across countries and over
6This follows, e.g., Paustian (2007), who shows that if a sufficient number of
identification restrictions is imposed, the sign of an unconstrained response can
be identified correctly.
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time. Our estimates offer some indirect (but not fully conclusive) evi-
dence for the possible “disciplining” role of explicit inflation targets
in both monetary and fiscal policies. This is in the sense of contribut-
ing to less-accommodative monetary responses to fiscal shocks, and
a subsequent improvement in the longer-term fiscal balance. Intu-
itively, the government understands that it can no longer buy votes,
because a more committed central bank would send voters the bill
in the form of higher mortgage rates.7
Keeping the limitations of our analysis in mind, what are the
tentative implications of our findings in regards to longer-term mon-
etary policy outcomes? How likely is forced debt monetization once
demographic factors intensify fiscal pressures? Our results suggest
that the United States and Japan may feature fiscal dominance,
roughly interpretable as the “passive monetary, active fiscal” pol-
icy regime in Leeper (1991), so their likelihood of experiencing an
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic may be rather high in the medium
to long term.
In contrast, our benchmark model places Australia and Canada
into, or close to, the monetary dominance regime (“active mone-
tary, passive fiscal”), in which an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic
is rather unlikely. Our results for Switzerland and the United King-
dom suggest that neither fiscal nor monetary policy dominates the
other, in which case a monetary-fiscal policy conflict over growing
public debt is likely to arise further down the track. Therefore, an
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic cannot be ruled out a priori.8
7As the world’s first inflation-targeting governor, Don Brash (2011a) argued:
“[A] major advantage in having the government and central bank formally agree
on the inflation target is that it really does mean that the government is forced to
take the inflation target into account as it determines its fiscal policy—because
it knows that any major change in the stance of fiscal policy must inevitably
trigger a response from the monetary authority. And because most governments
are constantly suffering from the temptation to run a more stimulatory fiscal
policy, knowing that that may provoke a tighter-than-otherwise monetary policy
is a most useful constraint.” For more discussion, see Brash (2011b) and Libich,
Savage, and Walsh (2011).
8While many countries have engaged in austerity measures in the aftermath of
the 2008 global financial crisis, these generally have taken the form of short-term
budget fixes. They have not performed long-term reforms of the pay-as-you-go
pension and health-care schemes that are essential in putting fiscal policy on a
sustainable path in an aging population.
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2. The Model
2.1 Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregression
The reduced-form TVP-VAR follows Cogley and Sargent (2005) and
Primiceri (2005):
yt = Xtβt + A−1t Σtεt t = p + 1, . . . , T, (1)
where yt is an M × 1 vector of endogenous variables, Xt = IM ⊗(
1, y′t−1, . . . , y
′
t−p
)
is a Kronecker product of the identity matrix with
a constant and lagged vectors of endogenous variables, p denotes the
number of lags, and εt denotes the vector of iid structural shocks.
An M(Mp + 1) × 1 vector βt stacks reduced-form coefficients, the
matrix At is a lower triangular matrix capturing contemporaneous
relations,
At =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 · · · 0
α21,t
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
αM1,t · · · αM,M−1,t 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
and the matrix of standard deviations of structural shocks, Σt, is
diagonal:
Σt =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ1,t 0 · · · 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 σM,t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
The TVPs follow random walks and a geometric random walk:
βi,t = βi,t−1 + uit i = 1, . . . ,M
2p + M, (2)
αi,t = αi,t−1 + v it i = 1, . . . ,
(
M2 − M) /2, (3)
log(σi,t) = log(σi,t−1) + wit i = 1, . . . ,M. (4)
Model innovations are assumed to be jointly normally distributed:⎡
⎢⎢⎣
εt
ut
vt
wt
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ∼ N
⎛
⎜⎜⎝0,
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
IM 0 0 0
0 U 0 0
0 0 V 0
0 0 0 W
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , (5)
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where the vectors ut, vt, and wt consist of innovations as intro-
duced in (2)–(4). The matrices U, V, and W are positive definite.
Moreover, V is assumed to be a block diagonal matrix, with blocks
constituted by the coefficient innovations from a particular equa-
tion, i.e., we assume that innovations to contemporaneous effects are
uncorrelated across equations. Finally, we follow Cogley and Sargent
(2005) and assume the matrix W to be diagonal. As noted in Kirch-
ner, Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier (2010), the reason is that fiscal
TVP-VARs usually consist of more variables than VARs for mon-
etary policy analysis and thus we need to reduce the number of
parameters.
The estimation of the system (1)–(5) employs a Gibbs sam-
pler. A sample from the joint posterior distribution of the param-
eter set is obtained from blocks that provide samples from condi-
tional distributions. Thus, draws from the VAR coefficients βi,t,
contemporaneous relations αi,t, volatility states σi,t, and the hyper-
parameters U, V, and W are produced by the sampler in turn. A
detailed description of the sampler and priors used can be found
in appendix 1. The Gibbs sampler generates 20,000 draws after a
burn-in period of 20,000. Only every fifth draw is kept to avoid the
autocorrelation of draws. Convergence diagnostics are presented in
appendix 2.
2.2 Endogenous Variables
Our set yt of endogenous variables consists of five variables: out-
put, private consumption, the short-term interest rate, government
debt, and government spending (consumption plus investment). This
adds government debt to the four endogenous variables included
in the baseline analyses of Kirchner, Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier
(2010) and Pereira and Lopes (2010) (the latter paper uses taxes
net of transfers instead of private consumption). Such choice is
very close to the set of endogenous variables usually employed in
VAR studies dealing with fiscal policy issues. VARs for monetary
policy analysis use mainly output, the interest rate, inflation, and
the exchange rate. It would be our preferred choice to also include
the latter two variables in our estimation and thus better capture
the monetary policy rule and open-economy features. But it is not
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computationally feasible due to the large number of estimated
parameters in the TVP-VAR framework.9
Nevertheless, for robustness we also report results for a specifica-
tion in which inflation is included (replacing private consumption),
and the nature of our baseline findings is unchanged. Furthermore,
it must be mentioned that the restricted number of endogenous vari-
ables does not necessarily pose a major problem for our analysis due
to its specific focus. In the literature (e.g., Mountford and Uhlig
2009) various monetary and price variables are employed to iden-
tify the monetary policy shock. These are important, as the interest
conventionally lies in the effects of the shock. But our interest lies in
strategic monetary-fiscal interactions, so we only need to distinguish
between fiscal and monetary policy shocks; we are not primarily
interested in the effects of the monetary policy shock. Table 1 will
show that even with the short-term interest rate as the only indica-
tor of the monetary policy stance, we are able to distinguish between
fiscal, monetary, and business cycle shocks.
2.3 Identification
The identification of structural shocks boils down to finding a lin-
ear combination of structural shocks εt that yields the reduced-form
residuals zt. The relationship between the two is modeled in (1) as
follows:
zt = A−1t Σtεt.
Three basic approaches to the identification of fiscal policy shocks
have been established in the literature. First, the event-study
approach (Ramey and Shapiro 1998) focuses on describing the effects
of an unexpected increase in government defense spending. Second,
the structural VAR approach (Blanchard and Perotti 2002) draws on
the assumption of a lagged reaction of fiscal variables to the changes
in economic conditions. Third, the identification scheme based on
sign restrictions is employed (Canova and Pappa 2007; Mountford
and Uhlig 2009; Pappa 2009), and later enriched by identifying
9The original Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri’s (2005) TVP-VAR
included only three variables, and the vast majority of applications feature four
variables.
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assumptions based on cointegration and magnitude restrictions (e.g.,
Dungey and Fry 2009).
Our identification procedure complements sign restrictions with
magnitude and contemporaneous restrictions, focusing on a govern-
ment spending shock.10 Government spending is defined as govern-
ment consumption and investment, i.e., total expenditures exclud-
ing government transfers. Similarly to Canova and Pappa (2007),
Dungey and Fry (2009), and Pappa (2009), we assume that a positive
debt-financed government spending shock increases (i) government
spending for four quarters, (ii) government debt for four quarters,
and (iii) output for two quarters. As shown in Pappa (2009), such
restrictions, at least on impact, are consistent with standard struc-
tural models of both the real business cycle and the New Keynesian
tradition, and they do not result from productivity, labor supply, or
monetary policy shocks.11
The imposed sign restrictions are described in the first row of
table 1. In the second and third row, table 1 presents reactions
of endogenous variables to a monetary policy shock and a generic
business cycle shock (e.g., a technology or labor supply shock). An
important feature is that the shocks either do not affect government
spending contemporaneously or they affect output and government
debt in opposite directions.
A rise in output and government debt can, however, also be
brought about by a tax cut and/or an increase in transfers. There-
fore, to filter out the effects of the government transfer and tax
shocks, we impose a magnitude restriction that an identified debt-
financed spending shock does not increase government debt more
than the amount of government spending for the four quarters
ahead.12 The situation where tax cuts imply an increase of tax
10Doing so, we avoid assuming passive fiscal policy that would be implied by
imposing a tax change corresponding to a spending shock.
11Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010) show, within a neoclassical growth model fit
to U.S. post-war data, that implementation delays of government investment can
even lead to a slight decline of output in the short run. We discuss anticipation
effects of fiscal shocks in appendix 3.
12In focusing on monetary-fiscal interactions, we need to distinguish a debt-
financed government spending shock from a tax cut shock and a government
transfers shock. This is because the real economy behaves differently after these
types of fiscal shocks. For example, private investment is usually crowded out in
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revenues cannot be distinguished from the government spending
shock within our identification framework, but such a scenario is
arguably unlikely. Finally, note that the magnitude restriction plays
to some extent a role of an equilibrium condition on the value of real
debt that implies that a future increase in spending lowers future
primary balances and thus the current value of debt. Leeper and Li
(2015) show how important it is to take into account the intertem-
poral equilibrium condition for debt valuation, especially in the case
of fiscal dominance. Dropping draws of orthonormal matrices that
do not satisfy the magnitude restriction essentially means dropping
the structural models that violate the condition.
Next, in order to capture the fact that government purchases do
not react much to the business cycle, we impose a zero contempo-
raneous restriction on the effect of a business cycle shock to gov-
ernment spending (see table 1). This is reminiscent of the recursive
identification of shocks when government spending is ordered before
GDP. Nevertheless, we do not restrict the contemporaneous feed-
back between government debt and output to allow for the effect of
automatic stabilizers on fiscal variables (taxes and debt). The con-
temporaneous restriction on the relationship between output and
government spending enables us to distinguish between fiscal shocks
and generic business cycle shocks. So, we basically identify two
shocks, which are orthogonal. One follows signs of a debt-financed
government spending shock and the other guarantees that there
is no contemporaneous reaction of government spending to such
shock.
Finally, let us stress that we do not impose any restrictions on
the interest rate because it is the variable of our main interest—
it summarizes the responses of monetary policy to debt-financed
spending shocks. Similarly, no restrictions on private consumption
are imposed because of the opposite predictions of the traditional
Keynesian and real business cycle models. The former predicts an
increase whereas the latter predicts a decrease in private consump-
tion following a debt-financed government spending shock (Gal´ı,
Lo´pez-Salido, and Valles 2007).
the case of excessive government spending but not in the case of a tax cut, so the
two shocks require a different response from the central bank.
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2.4 Implementation of the Identification Approach
Our identification implementation is based on the fact that for any
orthonormal matrix Q, i.e., for any matrix such that Q′Q = IM , it
holds that
zt = A−1t ΣtQ
′Qεt.
In such way a new set of uncorrelated structural shocks, ε˜t = Qεt,
with the same covariance matrix of reduced-form residuals, is pro-
duced.13 To generate orthonormal matrices we use Givens rotations,
i.e., orthonormal matrices of the form
Qij(θ) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 · · · cos(θ) · · · − sin(θ) · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · sin(θ) · · · cos(θ) · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
where the rotation angle is θ ∈ [0, π]. The respective goniometric
functions occupy the i-th and j-th columns and the i-th and j-th rows
of the matrix. For 5×5 matrices, any rotation can be constructed as
a product of ten possible Givens rotations:
Q(θ) =
5∏
i,j=1
i<j
Qij(θ).
In order to impose no impact of output on government spending in
a given period, we use only nine Givens rotations to guarantee zero
at the respective position (the first row and the second column) in
the matrix Q. Hence we have
Q (Θ) = Q24 (θ1)Q23 (θ2)Q14 (θ3)Q35 (θ4)Q34 (θ5)Q25 (θ6)Q45 (θ7)
Q15 (θ8)Q13 (θ9) .
13In contrast to Kirchner, Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier (2010) and Pereira and
Lopes (2010), the identification is not an integral part of the estimation proce-
dure. In their case, the estimated matrices of the contemporaneous effects already
embed the identification scheme.
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For each rotation, the sign and magnitude restrictions are checked.
Note that the magnitude restrictions are applied on a particular
draw of the rotation matrix, i.e., on a particular structural model.
For a given draw of the model parameters, at most forty rotations
are tested to find the ones that satisfy the sign and magnitude
restrictions. Distributions of impulse responses then arise from the
accepted Givens rotations.
Imposing the zero contemporaneous restriction by restricting the
set of Givens rotations allows us to avoid the penalty function used,
for example, in Mountford and Uhlig (2009). Caldara and Kamps
(2010) show how policy conclusions can be affected by the choice of
a specific penalty function. Moreover, some papers implement the
combination of zero and sign restrictions by rotating only a part of
the matrix of contemporaneous effects (e.g., Eickmeier and Hofmann
2013); their structural shocks are no longer orthogonal.
3. Data
All variables except the interest rate are in logs of real per capita
terms; the sources are described in appendix 6. The data are quar-
terly except for government debt, which is yearly, and which we
disaggregated into quarters using a simple univariate interpolation
method (Boot-Fiebes-Lisman).14 The data enter our analysis in lev-
els like in Kirchner, Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier (2010)—but unlike
in Pereira and Lopes (2010), who detrend the data. We use levels
for two reasons. First, trends can reveal valuable information about
monetary-fiscal interactions and how these have changed over time.
Second, we avoid the possibility of incorrectly imposing cointegration
relationships; see Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990).
Our choice of the lag length, namely two, is driven by both the
large number of estimated parameters and an attempt to best cap-
ture the dynamics of endogenous variables.15 We estimate the model
14This interpolation is one of the reasons for imposing sign restrictions on the
response of debt to four quarters: a change in government debt that occurs any-
time during the year is reflected by the debt data in all four quarters. This is also
true for the magnitude restrictions.
15In our setup two lags imply more than 10,000 parameters to estimate, whereas
three lags imply almost 20,000. The exact determination of the lag length based
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for Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. The country choice is driven by our interest in
comparing institutional setups with and without a legislated infla-
tion target. As there are only three advanced economies in the latter
category (Japan, the United States, and partly Switzerland), we pick
an equal number of early inflation targeters. Their choice follows
the justification of Dotsey (2006), most importantly the fact that
“their inflation rates were fairly well-contained before they adopted
inflation targeting.”
The data set in our baseline analysis covers the 1980:Q1–2008:Q2
period (for the United Kingdom it begins in 1981:Q1). Our baseline
model does not include data from the post-GFC period for four
reasons. First, our focus is on strategic monetary-fiscal interactions
of the medium- to long-term nature, i.e., cycle-free type behavior,
which is why excluding the biggest cyclical deviation in almost a
century seems desirable. Second, it is well documented that the post-
2008 period has featured increased risk, which could bias our con-
clusions regarding monetary-fiscal interactions (see, e.g., Martin and
Milas 2010). Third, during the global financial crisis central banks
affected the economy through many channels, including direct sub-
sidies to commercial banks and quantitative easing after hitting the
zero lower bound. Mixing periods of conventional and unconven-
tional monetary policy is very problematic; there is no consensus on
how to identify monetary and fiscal shocks without a considerable
enlargement of the set of variables, which we explained was not fea-
sible. Fourth, our priors are based on ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of the model on the whole sample, so extreme observations
can alter the estimates in a way unrepresentative of the medium- to
long-term developments.16
Nevertheless, as a demonstration we report the estimates includ-
ing post-2008 data for Canada and the United States in section
6.1. This extension shows that while our baseline results are robust,
on the marginal likelihood is beyond the scope of this paper, but its working
paper version provides some guidance from the sample autocorrelations.
16Even with a broadened set of variables, identification of unconventional mon-
etary policy measures has been subject to a heated debate in the literature, with
no consensus emerging yet. Regarding extreme observations, Canova (2007) sug-
gested that in the case of short samples it is preferable not to use a training
sample that gets discarded.
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including the recent crisis may overshadow them in magnitude and
may therefore lead to a loss of insight.
Two points in relation to our data choices are worth emphasiz-
ing. First, to analyze monetary-fiscal interactions, an appropriate
short-term interest rate must be chosen that reflects the monetary
policy stance for the whole period. This means that we cannot use
the currently announced instrument of the central bank, as it is not
informative of monetary policy behavior under older-style money
growth targeting—performed at the start of our sample. For this
reason we mainly use the Treasury bill rate. Second, government
spending data are usually available for a general level of govern-
ment (except the United Kingdom), whereas government debt data
are related to central government only. Assuming that the change
in general government debt is no smaller than the change in central
government debt, the magnitude restrictions imposed imply that the
change in general government spending does not exceed the change
in general government debt.
4. Tracking Monetary Responses to Fiscal Shocks
Our interest in the likelihood of an unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic—fiscal dominance over monetary policy—drives our
empirical analysis. We estimate impulse response functions (IRFs) of
endogenous variables to a positive debt-financed government spend-
ing shock. As shown by Fry and Pagan (2011), sign restrictions
can recover correct impulse responses to an unknown one-standard-
deviation shock, i.e., one cannot distinguish between the shock itself
and the contemporaneous effect of the shock on a variable.17 This
implies that the signs of the IRF provide accurate information. It
should be acknowledged that the same cannot be said with cer-
tainty about the magnitudes of the IRFs that are of interest for the
comparison between periods. However, assuming that the variance
in impacts is driven mainly by the shocks’ size—which is essen-
tially imposed by our prior belief on the hyperparameters driving
17Primiceri (2005) avoids this problem by assuming recursive identification and
by estimating the matrix of standard deviations Σt and the matrix of contem-
poraneous effects At separately. We adjust the matrices with the rotations and
hence forgo the possibility of distinguishing them.
Vol. 14 No. 3 Tracking Monetary-Fiscal Interactions 183
changes in respective parameters (shocks versus contemporaneous
effects)—we can also make tentative conclusions about the changes
in magnitude.
The impulse responses are normalized with respect to the median
impact of the shock on government spending. The size of the impact
equals unity, i.e., we discuss the responses of endogenous variables
after an unexpected 1 percent increase in real per capita government
spending. IRFs are in percent deviations from the steady state. The
only exception is the interest rate, which is considered in percentage
points.
4.1 Estimated Impulse Response Functions
To maintain attention on monetary-fiscal interactions, the main text
only reports the IRFs of the interest rate to a debt-financed spending
shock.18 Of greatest importance in regards to strategic monetary-
fiscal interactions is the central bank’s immediate response to the
government’s actions (i.e., the IRFs on impact), but its responses in
the several subsequent quarters may also offer valuable information.
The left column of figure 1 reports the medians of the posterior
distributions of IRFs for the horizon of up to sixteen quarters.19 In
general, a different IRF is estimated for each quarter in our sample.
The right column of figure 1 provides a more detailed picture of the
interest rate responses to fiscal shocks on impact and in the third
quarter.
4.2 Empirical Findings
Eyeballing figure 1, a tentative conclusion is that the degree of mon-
etary accommodation of debt-financed spending shocks seems to
have increased in the United States. In contrast, in the remaining
18For an illustration of the rest of the results, the responses on impact and in
the third quarter are available in appendix 4 for all variables and countries.
19Using median IRFs represents an approach that is standard in the literature.
However, Fry and Pagan (2011) criticize the use of pointwise median impulse
response on the grounds of consisting of different rotation matrices, i.e., no single
admissible model underlies the whole median response, and they suggest to report
the closest-to-median responses. Canova and Paustian (2011) examine this sug-
gestion and conclude that it may not lead to more accurate results. We therefore
stick to reporting the medians of the IRF distributions.
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Figure 1. IRFs of the Short-Term Interest Rate to a
1 Percent Debt-Financed Government Spending Shock
(continued)
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Figure 1. (Continued)
Notes: The left column shows all horizons; the right column shows responses on
impact (solid line) and in the third quarter (dotted line). The shaded areas indi-
cate the following: (i) Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom: introduction
of explicit inflation targets (in the latter also the subsequent granting of inde-
pendence), (ii) Japan: the zero-lower bound period, (iii) United States: change of
the Federal Reserve Chairman.
186 International Journal of Central Banking June 2018
countries it seems to have decreased or central bank responses to
fiscal shocks remained qualitatively unchanged. Let us discuss the
observations for each country, taking advantage of the fact that our
TVP-VAR framework allows for a nuanced view of the evolution
of monetary-fiscal interactions. A further discussion will follow in
relation to explicit inflation targets (section 5), various robustness
checks (section 6), and the likelihood of an unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic (section 7).
The results for the United States are especially noteworthy. A
strong monetary offset of fiscal shocks in the early 1980s is appar-
ent in figure 1, reflecting the tug-of-war between Chairman Paul
Volcker’s disinflation efforts and debt-accumulating fiscal policies of
the Reagan government. Such finding is in line with the estimates
of Davig and Leeper (2011). They identify this period as the “active
fiscal, active monetary” regime in which the government’s intertem-
poral budget constraint is not satisfied and public debt is on an
explosive path.
Importantly, figure 1 shows a regime change in U.S. monetary
policy. From the late 1980s (around the time of Volcker’s replace-
ment by Alan Greenspan) the Federal Reserve (the Fed) started
accommodating debt-financed government spending. Furthermore,
the degree of monetary accommodation increased gradually over the
course of Greenspan’s tenure—both on impact and over longer hori-
zons. The degree of accommodation reached its pre-2008 peak during
the George W. Bush administration. These findings are in line with
Davig and Leeper (2011), whose estimates characterize the period
from the early 2000s as “passive monetary” policy accommodating
“active fiscal” policy.20 But because our approach can capture grad-
ual changes, it shows that U.S. monetary accommodation of fiscal
shocks in fact goes further back in time.
The results for the other countries are in stark contrast to the
United States. In terms of Canada, figure 1 shows that the Bank
of Canada had a non-accommodative stance throughout the whole
sample period. In fact, it tended to offset fiscal shocks—on impact as
20They are also consistent with Batini, Callegari, and Guerreiro (2011), who
provide an estimate of the U.S. “fiscal gap” (unfunded liabilities). They argue
that “a full elimination of the fiscal and generational imbalances would require
all taxes to go up and all transfers to be cut immediately and permanently by
35 percent” (italics in the original).
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well as three to four quarters after the shock. In regards to Switzer-
land, monetary accommodation on impact was apparent in the 1980s
and partly also in the 1990s, but it disappeared in the 2000s. From
around 1999 we can see monetary offsetting of fiscal shocks on
impact. In terms of the United Kingdom, figure 1 makes apparent
that the degree of monetary accommodation of fiscal shocks by the
Bank of England decreased over time. The strong monetary accom-
modation observed in the 1980s was greatly reduced in the early
1990s and largely disappeared in the 2000s.
In the case of Japan, we see monetary accommodation over all
horizons throughout the whole sample. Naturally, its magnitude
decreased slightly from the mid-1990s because it was constrained
by the zero lower bound on interest rates. This is reflected in our
results even though we have not explicitly accounted for this bound.
In regards to Australia, figure 1 shows that in the mid-1980s
the Reserve Bank of Australia accommodated fiscal shocks on
impact, but over the three-to-four-quarter horizon it would reverse
this accommodation by tightening monetary policy. Such reac-
tive (backward-looking) rather than proactive (forward-looking)
responses tended to lead to a greater volatility in the economy and
were therefore inconsistent with the notion of interest rate smoothing
and optimal monetary policy in general. Nevertheless, figure 1 shows
that in the late 1980s the Bank started offsetting fiscal shocks, and
did so even more strongly since the second half of the 1990s, both
on impact and over longer horizons.
5. Exploring the Effect of Explicit Inflation Targets
Having reported our results regarding the changes in monetary-fiscal
interactions over time and across countries, let us now explore one
possible explanation for the observed differences. It relates to the
institutional design of monetary policy, namely legislating numeri-
cal inflation targets. Such explicit targets could in principle serve as
the central bank’s commitment device and hence alter the strategic
balance of power between monetary and fiscal policy.
5.1 Effect of Policy Leadership
The seminal work of Sargent and Wallace (1981) highlighted the
important effect of policy leadership on monetary-fiscal outcomes.
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It assumed that monetary policy moves upon observing the fiscal
actions, so it essentially put the government in the Stackelberg lead-
ership role in the game of chicken against the central bank. The
analysis demonstrated that in such a case we are likely to observe
fiscal dominance over monetary policy. Intuitively, an unsustainable
long-term fiscal stance may strategically force the follower, the cen-
tral bank, to address fiscal imbalances through monetary tools even
if it is formally independent from the government. Such unpleas-
ant monetarist arithmetic, however, jeopardizes price stability, as it
breaches the Tinbergen principle. The same conclusion is implied
by the “active fiscal, passive monetary” policy regime of Leeper’s
(1991) fiscal theory of the price level framework.
Importantly, in both frameworks socially undesirable departures
from price stability can be avoided under monetary leadership,
because the central bank has the stronger hand and can indirectly
induce the government to deal with fiscal imbalances. The game-
theoretic work in Libich, Nguyen, and Stehl´ık (2015) provides further
insights into such strategic policy interactions by generalizing the
discrete Stackelberg leadership concept into a continuous stochastic
leadership. The analysis shows that the likelihood of an unpleas-
ant monetarist arithmetic increases in the ratio of fiscal-to-monetary
leadership. This ratio determines whether it is the government or the
central bank that imposes itself as the stochastic leader in the game
of chicken, and to what extent they can induce the other institution
to cooperate.
To link these theoretic predictions to the real world, Libich,
Nguyen, and Stehl´ık (2015) use twelve existing measures in the lit-
erature to quantify indexes of monetary and fiscal leadership for
twenty-five high-income countries. The fiscal leadership index is an
average of eight components based on various existing measures of
fiscal space, fiscal path, fiscal governance, and fiscal balances, all
of which relate to the size of current and future fiscal imbalances.
A greater fiscal gap makes a fiscal reform more difficult politically
and hence gives the government a first-mover advantage. The mon-
etary leadership index has four components based on the central
bank’s political transparency and accountability, both of which are
increased by legislating an inflation target. This is because such
commitment gives the central bank a stronger mandate to offset
the possible inflationary effects of excessive fiscal policy by raising
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Figure 2. Monetary vs. Fiscal Leadership Indexes Using
Subset of Data from Libich, Nguyen, and Stehl´ık (2015)
Note: The arrows indicate the likelihood of an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.
interest rates, i.e., effectively punishing the government by elec-
torally unpopular increases in mortgage rates. The values for the
subsample of our six countries are depicted in figure 2.
The probability of an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic is the
highest in the top-left fiscal-dominance corner (with the United
States and Japan being the closest), lower in the middle region
(Switzerland and the United Kingdom), and the lowest in the
bottom-right monetary-dominance corner (Australia and Canada).
Given that these findings are consistent with our estimates reported
in section 4, we will consider the following two conjectures.
Conjecture 1. A legislated long-term inflation target may dis-
cipline monetary policy. By increasing the central bank’s payoff
from price stability, it may incentivize monetary policy to stop
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accommodating (or even to start offsetting) excessive debt-financed
government spending.
Conjecture 2. A legislated long-term inflation target may disci-
pline fiscal policy. By reducing the government’s payoff from exces-
sive debt-financed spending (through conjecture 1) it may improve
the long-term fiscal position.
Conjecture 1 is in line with conventional wisdom (see, e.g., Her-
rendorf 1998), but empirical evidence is scarce. Conjecture 2 is novel
and has not yet been examined empirically in the literature. Before
exploring the conjectures, however, let us mention one point upfront.
The literature has found it challenging to obtain persuasive empiri-
cal evidence of monetary and fiscal policy regime shifts. Therefore,
being able to attribute our empirical findings to one specific change
in the institutional design of monetary policy in a convincing manner
(from a statistical point of view) seems very unlikely a priori.
5.2 Conjecture 1: Can Explicit Inflation Targets
Discipline Monetary Policy?
If conjecture 1 is correct, upon legislating a numerical inflation tar-
get, the degree of monetary accommodation of fiscal shocks should
decrease or even be reversed into offsetting such shocks by raising
interest rates. Conversely, conjecture 1 predicts no change in coun-
tries without a legislated inflation objective, or possibly an increase
in monetary accommodation due to the (demographics driven) dete-
rioration in many countries’ long-term fiscal position.
In order to better contrast monetary policy behavior before
and after the introduction of an explicit numerical inflation tar-
get, figure 3 reports an additional perspective to figure 1, namely
the average responses of the interest rate for the two subperiods.
The three explicit inflation targeters (Australia, United Kingdom,
Canada) are in the right column, whereas the left column fea-
tures the two non-targeters (United States, Japan) and Switzerland,
the institutional setup of which is somewhere in between the two
groups.21
21For the non-targeting countries, the switch period for the computation of
average responses is set to 1992:Q4/1993:Q1 following Dotsey (2006).
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Figure 3. Median IRFs of the Interest Rate over a
Horizon of Sixteen Quarters in the Two Subsamples
Let us first discuss the results reported in figures 1 and 3 taken
at face value, without a reference to a measure of statistical sig-
nificance. It will become apparent in the next section, in which we
report credible (Bayesian confidence) intervals, that any conclusions
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must be drawn with a high degree of caution. The results are only
indicative, not conclusive.
In summary, the estimates in figure 3 for all countries are in
the direction predicted by conjecture 1. There was less monetary
accommodation or more monetary offsetting in Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom post-adoption of explicit inflation targets,
and more accommodation in the United States. The results for Japan
and Switzerland are also reconcilable with conjecture 1, as we explain
below.
Starting with the targeters, in Canada monetary accommodation
of fiscal shocks on impact was not conducted anytime throughout
the whole sample. In the three-to-four-quarter horizon, offsetting of
these shocks is apparent in figure 1, and its magnitude increased
especially from around the 1995–98 period, which was the horizon
of the second inflation target announced in 1993. Therefore, while
there is no major regime change visible in figures 1 and 3, the results
for Canada are broadly consistent with conjecture 1.
Australia’s results in figures 1 and 3 show a stronger offset of
debt-financed spending post-adoption of a numerical inflation tar-
get in 1993. This is, in line with conjecture 1, true of both impact
and longer horizons. Since then, the Reserve Bank of Australia has
been responding to fiscal shocks by raising the cash rate immedi-
ately and by further increasing it for another four quarters to offset
the effect of such shocks.22
In terms of the United Kingdom, monetary policy accommoda-
tion of fiscal shocks decreased slightly upon the introduction of an
explicit inflation target in 1992. But it subsequently increased again
and only started decreasing more substantially in the late 1990s—
after the Bank of England was granted formal independence from the
government.23 In line with conjecture 1, post-independence mone-
tary accommodation was markedly lower on impact and non-existent
over the medium- to long-term horizon whereby a monetary offset
occurred.
22For example, the Bank famously raised interest rates in November 2007, just
two weeks before a federal government election at a time when the Fed was
already loosening its stance due to the housing market problems.
23This seems to confirm what many have argued: formal instrument indepen-
dence of the central bank is a prerequisite for the inflation-targeting regime to
function effectively (see, e.g., Masson, Savastano, and Sharma 1997).
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Let us now turn to the remaining countries that do not have a
full-fledged legislated inflation target. The case of the United States
was discussed in detail in section 4, with monetary accommodation
of fiscal shocks gradually increasing over all horizons between the
late 1980s and the global financial crisis. The results are thus in
line with conjecture 1. The same can be said about Japan, despite
a slight reduction in monetary accommodation from the mid-1990s.
This is because Japanese monetary policy remained in the accom-
modative territory, and the reduction was due to the Bank of Japan
hitting the zero lower bound on interest rates, i.e., due to logistic
constraints rather than policy preferences.
In regards to Switzerland, the Swiss National Bank is institution-
ally somewhere in between the above two sets of countries. While
not considered a full-fledged inflation targeter, it has an upper bound
on medium-term inflation, similar to that of the European Central
Bank. Figures 1 and 3 show that in the period from 1999, when the
Swiss National Bank reiterated price stability to be an important
part of its monetary policy framework, it stopped accommodating
fiscal shocks on impact. This is, like the results for all the other five
countries, broadly consistent with conjecture 1.
5.3 Credible (Bayesian Confidence) Intervals
To get a sense of the uncertainty regarding our conjecture 1 results,
figure 4 presents the median of the posterior distribution of the dif-
ference between the short-term interest rate responses after a debt-
financed shock in each subsample. The median difference is supple-
mented with credible intervals of centered 68 percent of the posterior
distribution. The credible intervals for the United States and United
Kingdom are plotted, as they represent the typical outcome.
The credible intervals offer some evidence for the Fed’s growing
accommodation of fiscal shocks in the shorter term. In particular,
in the horizon of two quarters, slightly more than 70 percent of
the posterior distribution of differences of interest rate responses
lie in the positive region. On the other hand, in the United King-
dom for the horizon from six to ten quarters, around 70 percent of
the posterior distribution covers negative values, which indicates a
move from monetary accommodation to monetary offsetting. For the
methodological reasons discussed above, the lack of more conclusive
194 International Journal of Central Banking June 2018
Figure 4. Posterior Distribution of the Difference of
Interest Rate IRFs in the Two Subsamples for a Horizon
of Sixteen Quarters: United States (left) and
United Kingdom (right)
statistical significance is to be expected in this sort of analysis. A
further illustration of uncertainty related directly to IRFs can be
found in appendix 5.
5.4 Conjecture 2: Can Explicit Inflation Targets
Discipline Fiscal Policy?
Conjecture 2 posits that a legislated monetary commitment may,
through altered monetary responses to fiscal shocks, improve the
government’s incentives and thus fiscal outcomes towards sustain-
ability. Two pieces of indirect evidence are presented in Libich,
Nguyen, and Stehl´ık (2015). The first one shows that the corre-
lation between monetary and fiscal leadership is –0.51 among the
countries with an independent monetary policy. The second piece is
shown, in a somewhat modified fashion, in figure 5. It plots the cen-
tral government debt-to-GDP ratio for five early inflation targeters
and our three non-targeters. To better see the trends, the series are
demeaned.
In all five early targeters, one can observe a decrease in gov-
ernment debt starting about one to three years after the formal
adoption of an explicit inflation target (in the case of the United
Kingdom, after the subsequent granting of central bank instrument
independence). In contrast, similar sustained improvements in the
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Figure 5. Central Government Debt to GDP (demeaned)
for Five Early Explicit Inflation Targeters (gray lines) and
for Our Three Non-targeters (black lines)
Note: Shaded regions of gray lines indicate the regime’s adoption.
long-term fiscal balance are not present for the non-targeters. These
findings are robust; the same picture emerges if we plot the (primary)
deficit-to-GDP ratio.
It should, however, be emphasized that this finding, as well as
the negative correlation of monetary and fiscal leadership, does not
constitute evidence of causality. It is plausible that both the intro-
duction of inflation targeting and the improvement of fiscal policy
were driven by a common factor. Narrative evidence shows this to be
the case for Canada, where fiscal sustainability became the number
one policy issue for the public in the late 1980s; see Mauro (2011).
But experience of the other countries tells a different story; for an
example of New Zealand’s account by the world’s first inflation-
targeting governor, see Brash (2011a, 2011b). He argues: “I have
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not the slightest doubt that having legislation which requires gov-
ernment and central bank to formally agree, and disclose to the
public, the inflation rate which the central bank must target has a
most useful role in creating strong incentives for good fiscal policy.”
The fact that the improvement in fiscal balance was not con-
current with the adoption of inflation targets but was delayed a
few years points to a possible causal effect. Furthermore, the obser-
vation that fiscal outcomes continued to be well behaved in the
inflation-targeting countries depicted in figure 5—long after the orig-
inal governments departed from the office—provides some anecdotal
evidence for the “disciplining effect” of an explicit monetary com-
mitment over fiscal policy. In line with conjecture 2, reductions in
public debt-to-GDP ratios of the early inflation targeters spanned
over several subsequent governments of both left- and right-leaning
persuasions, and lasted all the way until the 2008 crisis.
Let us consider an alternative perspective on conjecture 2. It
implies that the estimated standard deviations of debt-financed gov-
ernment spending shocks should decrease after a numerical inflation
target is legislated. The fact that government spending does not
react contemporaneously to the business cycle shocks in our identi-
fication approach is an advantage, as it means that the reduced-form
residuals in the equation for government spending do not capture
immediate reactions of government spending to the state of the
macroeconomy. Figure 6 shows the standard deviation of reduced-
form residuals for government spending—the horizontal line indicat-
ing an average of the standard deviations for the two subsamples.
The figure shows—in line with conjecture 2—that the standard
deviation decreased post-adoption of formal inflation targeting in all
three considered targeters. Nevertheless, reductions in the volatility
of spending are present for the non-targeters as well, so no clear-cut
conclusions regarding conjecture 2 can be drawn from this exercise.24
24This is also because the reduced-form residuals can represent both an unex-
pected fiscal shock and an immediate reaction to an unexpected monetary policy
shock. Therefore, a decrease in the standard deviation of the reduced-form residu-
als could be caused not only by a reduction in the frequency/size of debt-financed
government spending shocks but also by a reduction in the response of the fiscal
authority to monetary policy actions.
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Figure 6. Estimated Standard Deviations of the
Reduced-Form Residuals for Government Spending
Notes: The vertical lines present the median; the horizontal lines (red in the
online version) show the median of average standard deviation over each sub-
sample. For the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia, the
shaded areas indicate changes in governments.
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Figure 7. IRFs for Canada Estimated on a Longer Sample
(1981:Q1–2016:Q2)
6. Robustness Checks
6.1 Inclusion of the Global Financial
Crisis (Post-2008 Data)
We spelled out above four reasons for not including the post-
2008 period in our baseline empirical analysis (for an analysis of
monetary-fiscal interactions in this period see, e.g., Tulip 2014).
Nevertheless, to illustrate the effect of extending the data range,
figure 7 reports the estimates for Canada, chosen due to the absence
of unconventional monetary policy in the post-2008 period. The
results show that our baseline findings are robust; the estimates
in figures 1 and 7 are similar in terms of their changes over
time.
Figure 8 presents extended estimation results for the United
States as well, but the covered period is shorter (1980:Q1–2010:Q4)
due to the above-discussed use of unconventional monetary policy.
Comparing these results with the baseline results in figure 1, espe-
cially the scale on the vertical axis, makes clear that the inclusion of
the data from the global financial crisis is undesirable. The post-2008
observations overshadow earlier developments and lead to a loss of
insight (not to mention the potential estimation problems due to an
increased risk premium, use of rescue packages, and quantitative eas-
ing). Nevertheless, the main finding of our baseline analysis that U.S.
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Figure 8. IRFs for the United States Estimated on a
Longer Sample (1980:Q1–2010:Q4)
Note: The shaded area indicates Alan Greenspan’s Chairmanship at the Federal
Reserve.
monetary policy has become more accommodative of debt-financed
fiscal shocks is still apparent.25
6.2 Inclusion of Inflation in the TVP-VAR
It is important to check whether our results are robust to includ-
ing inflation in the set of endogenous variables—given that monetary
policy decisions are linked to it. For computational reasons explained
above, we need to limit the TVP-VAR analysis to five endogenous
variables, which is why inflation will replace private consumption.
Figure 9 presents the responses of the interest rate to a 1 percent
debt-financed government spending shock, both on impact and in
the third quarter.
The responses of the interest rate convey, to a large extent,
the same message as our baseline results. The estimates are vir-
tually unchanged for Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom,
whereas for the United States and Canada the main differences lie
in the exact timing of the events and their quantitative rather than
qualitative nature. In terms of the United States, figure 9 indicates
that the Fed may have still maintained a slight monetary offset of
25See also Cobham (2013) for an empirical analysis of major central banks’
responses to house prices in the run-up of the global financial crisis.
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Figure 9. IRFs of the Interest Rate on Impact (solid line)
and in the Third Quarter (dotted line) to a 1 Percent
Debt-Financed Government Spending Shock
Notes: The shaded areas indicate the following: (i) Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom: introduction of explicit inflation targets (in the latter also the
subsequent granting of independence), (ii) Japan: the zero-lower bound period,
(iii) United States: change of the Fed Chairman.
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fiscal shocks in the 1990s, and only moved to their accommodation in
the late 1990s. Nevertheless, the gradual trend of weaker responses
to debt-financed government spending is apparent from the mid-
1990s. Similarly, the Bank of Canada may have been slightly in the
accommodative territory in the 1980s, but with the introduction of
explicit inflation targeting, a regime change is apparent, marking a
trend towards monetary offsetting of fiscal shocks.
Only the results for Australia provide a somewhat different pic-
ture from the baseline analysis, in that the large-scale disinflation in
the late 1980s appears (not very plausibly) as a period of growing
monetary accommodation. But even then the claim of conjecture
1 regarding the effect of explicit inflation targets seems to be sup-
ported, because the degree of monetary accommodation between the
early 1990s and 2008 has decreased substantially.
6.3 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions
To check the validity of our identification procedure and of TVP-
VARs more generally, the following sections present robustness exer-
cises based on single equations. The starting point is a forward-
looking Taylor-type monetary policy reaction function as introduced
in Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1998):
rt = (1 − ρ){α + βE[πt+4|Ωt](1 − ρ) + γE[xt|Ωt]} + ρrt−1 + vt,
where rt is the short-term interest rate, πt denotes inflation, xt
stands for the output gap, and vt is an exogenous random shock to
the interest rate. The parameter ρ captures the degree of interest rate
smoothing and Ωt describes the central bank’s information set at
time t.26 Assuming rational expectations, the estimation procedure
draws on the following orthogonality conditions:
E[rt − (1 − ρ)[α + βπt+4 + γxt] − ρrt−1|ut] = 0,
where the instrument set ut includes variables within the central
bank’s information set, ut ∈ Ωt. The vector of parameters [α, β, γ, ρ]
26In the case of Canada, the reaction function also includes the real CAD/USD
exchange rate.
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is estimated by a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM)
on the subsamples defined in section 4.27 In terms of the instruments,
we use a vector of ones, the first four lags of inflation, the output gap,
the interest rate, the growth of commodity prices, the federal funds
rate, and the growth of the real exchange rate.28 Table 2 reports the
estimation results.
Table 2 suggests the existence of changes in the conduct of mon-
etary policy. For all three inflation targeters (Canada, the United
Kingdom, and Australia), the coefficient on expected inflation shifts
from a value of well below 1 to a value well above 1 after legislating
a numerical inflation target. This means that the Taylor principle
was only adhered to in the inflation-targeting era, but not before
that.29
Such finding is in stark contrast to the remaining (non-targeting)
countries. Most interestingly, in the United States the response to
expected inflation has decreased substantially. As a result, in the
second half of the sample the Fed’s coefficient on expected inflation
is much lower than in the three inflation-targeting countries, whereas
the opposite was the case in the first part of the sample. In Switzer-
land the coefficient on expected inflation has not changed much and
27The estimation approach requires stationarity of regressors. The null of the
unit-root presence cannot often be rejected in our case according to the aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test. For example, for Switzerland and Japan, no regressor
seems to be stationary according to the test. However, the low power of such a
test in the case of small samples suggests carrying out the GMM exercise regard-
less of the results of stationarity tests. Note that our subsamples contain from
forty to seventy observations, and they are shortened from both sides due to the
presence of leading and lagged terms in the estimated equation.
28Due to the strong trade ties between the United States and Canada, the first
four lags of the CAD/USD real exchange rate are added to the set of instruments
for Canada. Moreover, up to four lags of the M2 growth are added. For Switzer-
land, the first four lags of the three-month German interbank market rate are
added, as the interlinkages between the Swiss and German financial markets play
an important role for Swiss monetary policy. For the United States, the four lags
of the real exchange rate growth are replaced by four lags of the spread between
the ten-year Treasury constant maturity and the federal funds rate. The first four
lags of M2 growth are also included.
29In the pre-inflation-targeting part of the sample, the estimate of the value of
the coefficient on expected inflation being below unity is statistically significant
for all three targeters. The opposite finding of the Taylor principle being satisfied
post-adoption of explicit inflation targets is, however, not statistically significant,
which is probably a consequence of weak instruments (see appendix 5).
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Table 2. Monetary Policy Reaction Functions
Using a Two-Step GMM
β γ ρ J-stat.
United States
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 3.33 0.5 0.89 8.39
(0.61) (0.46) (0.04) 0.8127
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 1.51 1.98 0.91 8.71
(1.45) (0.38) (0.03) 0.7941
Switzerland
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 0.93 1.26 0.68 10.33
(0.09) (0.21) (0.04) 0.9957
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 1.06 1.37 0.87 11.15
(0.21) (0.20) (0.01) 0.9922
Japan
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 0.65 1.88 0.82 10.29
(0.24) (0.29) (0.03) 0.9749
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 0.04 0.42 0.91 9.44
(0.08) (0.10) (0.01) 0.9853
Canada
1981:Q1–1990:Q4 −1.96 0.73 0.81 7.09
(0.15) (0.03) (0.00) 0.9999
1991:Q1–2008:Q2 1.97 1.98 0.9 13.39
(0.88) (0.35) (0.02) 0.9910
United Kingdom
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 0.46 1.53 0.8 8.84
(0.18) (0.32) (0.04) 0.9904
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 2.63 9.23 0.93 11.53
(1.16) (3.97) (0.03) 0.9513
Australia
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 0.64 1.51 0.69 9.76
(0.07) (0.15) (0.02) 0.9819
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 3.16 −0.22 0.95 10.45
(1.73) (1.35) (0.02) 0.9725
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; the p-value is reported below the
J-statistic. Headline CPI inflation is used (except Canada and the United Kingdom, where
core inflation is used). Output gaps are computed using the HP filter with the smoothing
parameter equal to 1600 except for the United States (where the Congressional Budget
Office’s estimate is used) and Canada (where the Bank of Canada’s estimate is used). The
commodity price growth is the annual change of the producer price index for all commodi-
ties. The real exchange rate growth is the log-difference of the real effective exchange rate
based on the manufacturing consumer price index. All data are taken from the Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database.
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is around 1. In Japan it has decreased to a value close to 0, which
is expected given its zero lower bound constraint.30
These results support the nature of our baseline findings and
suggest that an appropriate methodology must include possibility
of changes in the policy stance over time to capture real-world
developments.
6.4 Extended Monetary Policy Reaction Function
(Featuring Fiscal Shocks) for the United States
Here we add fiscal shocks into the empirical specification of the pre-
vious section. The fiscal shocks are extracted using the so-called
narrative approach, namely a defense news shock constructed by
Ramey (2016). In particular, the following model is used:
rt = (1 − ρ) {α + βE [πt+4|Ωt] + γE [xt|Ωt] + ξE [zt|Ωt]}+ρrt−1+υt,
where zt stands for one of the following variables: fiscal shock, money
growth, and lagged inflation. In using the latter two variables we fol-
low Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1998). The results are presented in
table 3.
Table 3 shows that additional regressors in the U.S. monetary
policy rule do not alter our key finding about a decline in the Fed’s
inflation focus over time. Furthermore, the fiscal shock seems to be
important in both subsamples. The estimates imply that an expected
change in defense spending of the size of 1 percent of lagged nominal
GDP was (on average) followed by a 1.43 percentage point increase
of the federal funds rate during 1980:Q1–1992:Q4, but by a 3.05 per-
centage point decrease in the 1993:Q1–2008:Q2 period. This shows
that in the former period monetary policy tended to offset fiscal
shocks, whereas in the latter period it accommodated them.
Caution, however, needs to be exercised in interpreting these
additional results, as there appear some econometric issues related
to the employed methodology, well-documented in the literature.
30Let us mention that our estimates are broadly in line with those of others.
For example, based on U.S. quarterly data over the 1979:Q3–1996:Q4 period,
Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000) found the coefficient on expected inflation and
the output gap to equal 2.15 and 0.93, respectively.
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Table 3. Extended Monetary Policy Reaction Function
for the United States
β γ ρ ξ J-stat.
Benchmark (Model of Section 6.3)
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 3.33 0.5 0.89 8.39
(0.61) (0.46) (0.04) 0.8127
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 1.51 1.98 0.91 8.71
(1.45) (0.38) (0.03) 0.7941
Money Growth
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 4.24 0.73 0.93 −13.65 8.27
(1.54) (0.93) (0.04) (10.41) 0.9404
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 0.49 2.24 0.9 −9.62 10.16
(1.14) (0.59) (0.04) (4.42) 0.8579
Lagged Inflation
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 3.53 0.5 0.89 −0.09 8.1
(1.48) (0.48) (0.04) (0.56) 0.7776
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 0.56 1.69 0.89 1.24 7.04
(0.9) (0.22) (0.03) (0.51) 0.8548
Defense News
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 2.53 1.04 0.89 1.43 9.94
(0.46) (0.31) (0.02) (0.39) 0.9916
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 1.21 1.39 0.89 −3.05 10.84
(1.07) (0.14) (0.03) (0.83) 0.9848
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; the p-value is reported below the
J-statistic. Data are taken from the FRED database except the defense news, which
are from Ramey (2016) as a percentage of lagged nominal GDP. Money growth is the
quarterly average of month-on-month growth of M2. Lagged inflation is represented
by the first lag of year-on-year CPI change.
They include small-sample properties of GMM estimators (e.g., Jon-
deau, Le Bihan, and Galles 2014) and weak instruments (e.g., Stock,
Wright, and Yogo 2002 or Mavroeidis 2010). An in-depth analysis
of such issues is beyond the scope of this robustness exercise, but
some relevant results and comments regarding the strength of the
instruments are offered in appendix 3.
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6.5 Using a Narrative Measure of Monetary Policy Shocks
A natural extension of employing a narrative measure of government
spending is to examine the relationship between monetary and fiscal
shocks directly, i.e., without imposing any dynamics even within a
single-equation framework. To that end, we take the narrative meas-
ures of both policies’ shocks in the United States and examine their
linkages over our subsamples.
Together with Ramey’s (2016) defense news shocks, we use mon-
etary policy shocks constructed by Romer and Romer (2004) and
extended until 2007:Q4 by Wieland and Yang (2016).31 The narra-
tive measure of monetary policy shocks is constructed such that
the intended federal funds rate, derived from the Fed’s reports,
is adjusted by the estimated monetary reaction to the economic
situation—as captured by the Fed’s internal forecasts. What is left
after taking into account the forecast is the monetary policy shock.
The two sets of narrative-type shocks are used in a simple lin-
ear model, which regresses monetary policy shocks (only) on fiscal
shocks using OLS, separately on the 1980:Q1–1992:Q4 and 1993:Q1–
2007:Q4 subsamples. While the coefficient on the defense news shock
is not statistically significant for the earlier period, for the later
period it is (the p-value being 0.07). Quantitatively, between 1993
and 2008 an expected increase in fiscal (defense) spending in the
value of 1 percent of lagged nominal GDP decreased the monetary
policy rate by 9 basis points on average. Such reaction by the Fed
was the systematic response over and above what is contained in
their internal forecasts used for the construction of narrative shocks,
which is why its magnitude is naturally much lower than that of the
previous section. This result provides further evidence of a more
accommodative stance of U.S. monetary policy to fiscal shocks in
the 1990s and 2000s, in line with our baseline findings.
7. Conclusions: Is Unpleasant Monetarist
Arithmetic To Be Feared?
It is now widely accepted that monetary and fiscal policies are
interlinked even if the central bank is formally independent of the
31The data are kindly provided by Johannes Wieland at https://sites.google.
com/site/johannesfwieland.
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government. This is because the actions of each policy affect many
important economic variables and these variables in turn affect the
actions of both policies. The paper’s primary aim was to track
monetary-fiscal interactions over time and across six advanced coun-
tries in order to contribute to our understanding of the relation-
ship between the two policies. Our secondary aim was to use this
understanding in assessing the medium- and long-term danger of an
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic—the concerns that fiscal excesses
may spill over to monetary policy and result in departures from price
stability.
We do so using an empirical framework that combines time-
varying parameter vector autoregression with the sign-restrictions
identification procedure. Having first discussed the advantages of
this framework vis-a`-vis the standard fixed-parameter VARs and/or
the recursive identification method, we then report how monetary
policy responses to debt-financed government spending shocks have
changed since 1980.
It is shown that while in the United States monetary policy
responses to debt-financed fiscal shocks have become more accom-
modative over time, the opposite seems to have been the case in
Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Our subsequent analysis explores one possible institutional rea-
son for some of the observed changes and country differences, namely
adoption of numerical inflation targets. We provide some evidence
that such a commitment gives the central bank more ammunition in
dealing with the government’s excessive spending. This implies that
numerical inflation targets may be able to discipline both policies,
i.e., they may lower the degree of monetary accommodation of fiscal
shocks as well as induce a reduction in long-term fiscal imbalances.
While we offer several robustness checks that support our base-
line results, the presented evidence is still not conclusive. It is insuf-
ficient to unambiguously confirm our two conjectures and, more
generally, the fact that an institutional reform of one policy may
have positive effects on the other policy through strategic interac-
tions. More research is thus required to shed light on the many
specific channels through which monetary and fiscal policies inter-
act with each other. This is of particular importance in the cur-
rent situation of large (demographics-driven) fiscal imbalances facing
advanced countries in the decades to come.
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Keeping these limitations in mind, our analysis implies some
tentative predictions in regards to the probability of Sargent and
Wallace’s (1981) unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. They are based
not only on all our baseline and auxiliary results but also on the
trends in intertemporal fiscal imbalances and strength of the legis-
lated commitment to low inflation (see figure 2). All these results
imply that the likelihood of undesirable long-term spillovers from
fiscal onto monetary policy is the lowest in Australia and Canada,
somewhat higher in the United Kingdom and Switzerland, and the
highest in the United States and Japan.
In particular, Australia and Canada appear to operate within
the monetary-dominance regime of active monetary and passive fis-
cal policy, so an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic seems unlikely.
This is in contrast to the United States and Japan, both of which
seem to be stuck within a fiscal-dominance regime. In this regime,
monetary policy passively accommodates active fiscal policy, so fis-
cal inflation due to debt monetization is much more likely in the
future (once demographic pressures intensify). Switzerland and the
United Kingdom seem to be somewhere in between, as neither policy
dominates the other. Because of that, a costly tug-of-war between
their central banks and governments may eventuate in the future.
Overall, our analysis suggests that the danger of advanced coun-
tries experiencing an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic should not
be underestimated. More research will hopefully improve our under-
standing of monetary-fiscal interactions that is crucial in designing
welfare enhancing institutional reforms of the two policies.
Appendix 1. Gibbs Sampler
The specification of the sampling algorithm and parameters of prior
distributions mostly follows Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri
(2005), Kirchner, Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier (2010), and Pereira
and Lopes (2010).
Priors
The prior distribution of the initial states αi,0, βi,0, log(σi,0) is nor-
mal with means given by the corresponding OLS estimates on the
whole data sample. Assumed prior variances are proportional to the
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estimated OLS variances for coefficients and to the identity matrix
for the volatility states:
βi,0 ∼ N
(
βOLSi,0 , 4V ar
(
βOLSi
))
,
αi,0 ∼ N
(
αOLSi,0 , 4V ar
(
αOLSi
))
,
log (σi,0) ∼ N
(
log
(
σOLSi
)
, 10I5
)
.
The hyperparameter U and blocks of V are distributed as inverse-
Wishart distribution:
U ∼ IW (k2QτV ar (βOLS) , τ) ,
Vbl ∼ IW
(
k2V (1 + dim (Vbl))V ar
(
AOLSbl
)
, 1 + dim (Vbl)
)
,
bl = 1, . . . , 4,
where kQ = 0.01 and kV = 0.1. These parameters represent our prior
beliefs on the proportion of uncertainty of the OLS estimate attrib-
uted to time-variation of the VAR coefficients and elements of the
matrix A. The “degrees of freedom” parameter τ is 50.32 The diago-
nal elements of W are distributed as inverse-Gamma (see Kirchner,
Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier 2010):
Wi = IG
(
k2w
2
,
1
2
)
, where kW = 0.01.
Estimation Procedure
The Gibbs sampler exploits the fact that draws from the conditional
distributions of the subsets of the model parameters (given the rest
of the parameter set) represent a sample from the joint posterior
distribution. The sampler can then be described in the following
steps:
• The vector of coefficient states β is estimated using the Carter
and Kohn (1994) algorithm. For given data and the history
of the covariance and volatility states, equations (1) and (2)
32For Canada estimated for the 1981–2016 period, we increase the “degrees of
freedom” parameter by the number of observations to make the prior tighter.
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represent a linear Gaussian system with a known covariance
matrix.
• Covariance states stacked in the matrix At are also estimated
employing the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994). Equation
(1) implies that
yˆt = At (yt − Xtβt) = Σtεt, (6)
i.e., given data and the history of coefficient and volatility
states, we again obtain a linear Gaussian system. The algo-
rithm is applied equation by equation so it yields draws of the
covariance states stacked below the diagonal of At in turns.
• To draw volatility states, we follow Cogley and Sargent
(2005).33 Given data and the history of the coefficient and
covariance states, the right-hand side of (6) is observable.
Assuming diagonality of the hyperparameter W , volatility
states can be drawn as in Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994),
that is, a univariate algorithm is applied on the orthogonal-
ized residuals element by element. Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi
(1994) describe a Metropolis step that produces a draw (if
accepted) from the conditional posterior distribution for a
volatility state.
• Finally, given the data, coefficient states, and covariance and
volatility states, the innovations in (2)–(4) are observable.
Priors on hyperparameters are distributed as inverse-Wishart
(inverse-Gamma), thus posterior distributions take the same
type of distribution and drawing of the hyperparameters is
straightforward.
Appendix 2. Convergence Diagnostics
The convergence of the sequence of draws to a posterior distribution
is assessed by two measures based on the autocorrelation of draws
and by the diagnostics suggested by Raftery and Lewis (1992).34
The first measure is a simple autocorrelation of draws from the
33This avoids the problem discussed in Del Negro and Primiceri (2014).
34The same convergence diagnostics as in Primiceri (2005) are presented. The
implementation in MATLAB draws on the Econometrics Toolbox discussed in
LeSage (1999).
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Figure 10. Autocorrelation, Inefficiency Factors, and
the Raftery and Lewis Statistic for Model Parameters
in Australia for 1985:Q1
conditional posterior distributions with a lag equal to 10. Low auto-
correlation suggests efficiency of the sampling algorithm. A more
sophisticated measure based on sample autocorrelations takes into
account autocorrelations at all possible lags. It is referred to as the
“inefficiency factor” and defined as 1+ 2
∑∞
k=1 ρk, with ρk denoting
the k-th autocorrelation of the chain of draws. Primiceri (2005) sug-
gests that values of the inefficiency factor below 20 can be viewed
as satisfactory. Finally, Raftery and Lewis (1992) introduced a sta-
tistic that provides the number of draws ensuring a certain level of
precision.35
Due to a high number of parameters, figure 10 presents the con-
vergence diagnostics only for Australia, and only for the coefficients
related to an arbitrarily chosen period 1985:Q1. For other countries
and periods, the convergence statistics look very similar.
The statistics presented in figure 10 suggest a sufficient conver-
gence of the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm for parameters:
autocorrelation of the chain is low, inefficiency factors achieve values
below 20, and the suggested number of runs is lower than 4,000. The
hyperparameters are reported in figures 11–13.
35In this paper, for the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of marginal posterior distrib-
utions, the desired accuracy of 0.025 is required to be achieved with probability
0.95.
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Figure 11. Autocorrelation of the Chain for the
Hyperparameters U, V , and W
Figure 12. Inefficiency Factors for the Hyperparameters
U, V , and W
Figure 13. Raftery and Lewis Statistics for the
Hyperparameters U, V , and W
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Appendix 3. Further Discussion of Robustness
Anticipation Effects
Government spending shocks are often anticipated by agents because
of implementation and legislative lags. Anticipation effects of fiscal
policy can be related to the timing of a spending shock (Ramey
2011) or the way future fiscal adjustment will be carried out (Leeper,
Walker, and Yang 2010).
The identification approach used in this paper can deal with the
first type of anticipation effects similarly to Mountford and Uhlig
(2009), who account for “announcement effects” by imposing a pos-
itive sign on their fiscal variable after four quarters. For the first
four quarters, the fiscal variable is assumed to be inert and the pre-
scribed signs of other responses do not change. Using U.S. data,
Mertens and Ravn (2010) demonstrate that anticipation effects of
spending shocks do not determine the sign of the output reaction.
Therefore, our identification approach is not affected by the presence
of such type of anticipation effects.
The latter type of anticipation effects—agents’ expectations of
the way current fiscal shortfalls are reversed by the future fiscal-
monetary mix—could in principle be an issue for our identification
strategy. This would be the case if different expected ways of a
fiscal adjustment affected the macroeconomy differently and satis-
fied the same set of identification restrictions. Nevertheless, in our
analysis the problem is partially mitigated by our strict focus on
debt-financed spending. Furthermore, one of our robustness exer-
cises shows that a change in the number of quarters for which the
magnitude restriction is imposed changes the magnitude and profile
of impulse responses only marginally.
Priors
Another robustness exercise suggests that the length of the sign
restrictions affects the magnitudes of the responses to some extent.
Similarly to Primiceri (2005), we find the results to be robust to the
choice of priors for the variance of the initial states. We also find that
our prior belief for the parameter U , which drives how much coef-
ficients can differ between adjacent periods, influences significantly
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the posterior variation of coefficients and thus the resulting impulse
responses. Nevertheless, our prior belief reflected by the parameter
is that changes in the economy and coefficients are gradual.
Instruments
The problem of weak instruments arises when only a small por-
tion of the variation of an endogenous variable is predictable by
the instrument. The consequence is generally unreliable inference.
Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) mention several possible manifes-
tations of weak instruments, such as the difference between the
two-step and the iterated GMM estimators, as well as sensitivity to
adding instruments or changing the sample. To shed some light on
the possible presence of weak instruments, we reestimate the model
in section 6.4 using an iterative GMM. The results are presented in
table 4.
Table 4 shows that estimates can differ somewhat from those in
table 2 that use a two-step GMM. This could signal presence of weak
instruments.36 Nevertheless, our key findings regarding increased
monetary accommodation in the United States and the effect of
explicit inflation targets seem to remain unchanged. More gener-
ally, all our results suggest that the reaction of monetary policy
to fiscal shocks has changed over time, and support the use of a
modeling framework such as the TVP-VAR that allows for such
changes.
36There exist procedures robust to weak identification (e.g., Kleibergen 2005),
based on a continuously updated GMM objective function. Its optimization is,
however, numerically unstable in our case. We therefore use the two-step and
iterative GMM methods.
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Table 4. Monetary Policy Reaction Functions
Using Iterative GMM
β γ ρ J-stat.
United States
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 9.44 −0.67 0.92 7.91
(2.62) (0.75) (0.03) 0.8494
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 −0.14 1.58 0.79 9.05
(0.39) (0.10) (0.04) 0.7688
Switzerland
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 1.12 0.59 0.6 10.1
(0.06) (0.18) (0.03) 0.9964
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 1.25 0.81 0.9 10.51
(0.22) (0.23) (0.01) 0.9950
Japan
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 −1.53 0.82 0.94 9.33
(1.65) (1.34) (0.03) 0.9864
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 0.34 −0.09 0.93 8.54
(0.11) (0.12) (0.01) 0.9924
Canada
1981:Q1–1990:Q4 −1.67 0.65 0.65 6.85
(0.22) (0.02) (0.00) 1.000
1991:Q1–2008:Q2 1.06 1.13 0.8 12.3
(0.21) (0.08) (0.01) 0.9955
United Kingdom
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 −0.01 2.53 0.74 8.74
(0.12) (0.27) (0.03) 0.9911
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 1.61 14.99 0.99 11.66
(4.03) (23.71) (0.02) 0.9482
Australia
1980:Q1–1992:Q4 0.68 1.93 0.77 9.31
(0.07) (0.34) (0.02) 0.9866
1993:Q1–2008:Q2 1.19 −0.91 0.88 9.7
(0.27) (0.47) (0.02) 0.9825
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; the p-value is reported below the
J-statistic. Headline CPI inflation is used (except Canada and the United Kingdom, where
core inflation is used). Output gaps are computed using the HP filter with the smoothing
parameter equal to 1600 except for the United States (where the Congressional Budget
Office’s estimate is used) and Canada (where the Bank of Canada’s estimate is used). The
commodity price growth is the annual change of the producer price index for all com-
modities. The real exchange rate growth is the log-difference of the real effective exchange
rate based on the manufacturing consumer price index. All data are taken from the FRED
database.
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Appendix 4. IRFs to a Debt-Financed Government
Spending Shock for All Countries and
Variables at Two Horizons
As explained above, in order to keep our focus we do not include
an in-depth discussion of results other than relating to monetary-
fiscal policy interactions. A selection of the results—namely impulse
responses on impact and the third quarter—appears in figures 14–19.
Figure 14. United States—IRF on Impact and
in the Third Quarter
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Figure 15. Canada—IRF on Impact and
in the Third Quarter
Figure 16. Switzerland—IRF on Impact and
in the Third Quarter
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Figure 17. United Kingdom—IRF on Impact and
in the Third Quarter
Figure 18. Japan—IRF on Impact and
in the Third Quarter
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Figure 19. Australia—IRF on Impact and
in the Third Quarter
Appendix 5. Illustration of the Estimated “Uncertainty”
This appendix provides more details regarding the uncertainty of
the results produced by our benchmark TVP-VAR model. Figures 20
and 21 show median and centered 68 percent of posterior distribution
of IRFs on impact.
The figures demonstrate that vast majority of changes in impact
over time cannot be viewed as statistically significant in the Bayesian
sense. Some evidence of change can be detected only for the impact
response of interest rate for the United States.
220 International Journal of Central Banking June 2018
Figure 20. Canada—IRF on Impact with Centered
68 Percent of the Posterior Distribution
Figure 21. United States—IRF on Impact with Centered
68 Percent of the Posterior Distribution
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